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What interests us are not the facticities 
[Faktizitäten] of consciousness and in-
stances of it elapsing [Abläufe], but ra-
ther the problems of its essence 
[Wesensprobleme], problems which 
would need to be formulated there. 
(Husserl, Ideas § 135, p. 269; Hua III/1 
312) 
 
In this paper I shall focus on the following mat-
ters: (a) what is new in Husserl’s Ideas (b) the 
need for a transcendental epoché or reduction 
in order to access the noesi-noema correlation 
(c) the complex structure of an intentional 
Erlebnis and some aspects of noesis and noema  
(d) the eidetic laws Husserl identifies, and, 
finally, (e) some remarks on the role of the ego 
in the stream of experiences (Erlebnisstrom). 
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No nos interesan las facticidades  [Fakti-
zitäten] de la conciencia y de sus cursos 
[Abläufe], pero sí los problemas esencia-
les [Wesensprobleme],  que aquí habría 
que formular. (Husserl, Ideas §135, p. 
412; Hua III/1 312) 
 
En el presente artículo me centraré en las si-
guientes cuestiones: (a) que hay de nuevo en 
las Ideas de Husserl (b) la necesidad de una 
epoché trascendental o una reducción para 
acceder a la correlación noesis- noema (c) la 
estructura compleja de Erlebnis intencional y 
algunos aspectos de noesis y noema (d) las 
leyes eidéticas identificadas por Husserl y, 
finalmente, (e) algunas observaciones sobre el 
papel del ego en la corriente de las vivencias 
(Erlebnissstorm) 
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Just over one hundred years ago, on 2nd April 1913, Edmund Husserl pub-
lished the First Book of his planned three-volume Ideen zu einer reinen 
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Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine 
Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie (Ideas towards a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: General Introduction to Pure Phenome-
nology, hereafter ‘Ideas’) in Volume One of his newly founded Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Yearbook for Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research),1 a yearbook that he jointly edited with his fellow 
phenomenologists Alexander Pfänder (1870-1941), Adolf Reinach (1883-1917), 
Moritz Geiger (1880-1937) and Max Scheler (1874-1928).  
Husserl was already 54 years old when he published Ideas and he intended 
it as a programmatic book on the phenomenological method and on the overall 
scope of phenomenological philosophy (a new idea captured in the very title of 
the Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research). The book stands 
at the ‘entrance gate to phenomenology’, offering a ‘purely introductory medi-
tation’ (eine emporleitende Meditation, III/1 223). Husserl writes: 
 
Here, in the context of our meditations that merely lead up to phenomenology, the 
task cannot be to expound its components systematically (Ideas § 96, p. 192; III/1 
223) 
 
There is no ‘royal road’ (Königsweg, III/1 223) to phenomenology; each set 
of problems has to be tackled on its own. 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations (Logische Untersuchungen, 1900/1901) 2 
had already presented a detailed discussion of what Husserl, following Dilthey 
calls Erlebnisse, that is mental experiences, mental occurrences, or lived expe-
 
 
1 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: 
Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie appeared in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und 
phänomenologische Forschung, edited by Edmund Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Max Scheler, Moritz Geiger 
and Alexander Pfänder (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913), vol. I, pp. 1-323. A critical edition (with 
corrections) has been prepared by Karl Schuhmann for the Husserliana series, Husserliana [hereafter 
‘Hua’] III/1 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977). Schuhmann’s edition includes comments and corrections added 
by Husserl in his four different personal copies of the text. William Boyce Gibson translated the work as 
Ideas. A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931). In 1983 Fred 
Kersten produced a second English translation entitled Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to 
a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book for the Husserl Collected Works series (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1983). Most recently, Dan Dahlstrom has re-translated it as Edmund Husserl, Ideas I (Indianapo-
lis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2014). Hereafter, reference will be to ‘Ideas’ followed by 
the page number of the new Dahlstrom translation and the Husserliana (hereafter ‘Hua’) volume and 
page number.  
2 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 
2. Auflage, hrsg. E. Holenstein, Husserliana vol. XVIII (Dordrecht: Springer, 1975) and Logische 
Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, in 
zwei Bänden, Husserliana XIX/1 and XIX/2, ed. Ursula Panzer (Dordrecht: Springer, 1984), trans. John 
Findlay, Logical Investigations, 2 Vols. ed. with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran and New Preface 
by Michael Dummett. (London & New York: Routledge, 2001). Hereafter ‘LU’ followed by the Investiga-
tion number, paragraph number and pagination of English translation (vol. 1 = I; vol. 2 = II), followed 
by Husserliana volume number in Roman numerals and page number. 
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riences, in terms of their intentional character, objectivating structure, their 
‘parts and moments’ and their relation to their intended object and its indwell-
ing ‘sense’ (Sinn). Husserl revisited this analysis in his Ideen (1913), extending 
it greatly, correcting some earlier formulations and indeed bringing his discus-
sion to a whole new plane (that of transcendental philosophy which breaks with 
philosophy done in the ‘natural attitude’). He has initially planned to revise the 
Logical Investigations to bring it into line with his new flagship Ideas, but this 
project seemed too vast and he abandoned it, simply publishing a second edi-
tion with some revisions, notes and clarifications. As he writes in his Foreword 
to the Second Edition (1913) of the Investigations: 
 
I decided first of all to plan my Ideas. They were to give a universal yet contentful 
presentation of the new phenomenology, based throughout on actual executed work, a 
presentation of its method, of its systematic field of problems, of its function in making 
possible a strictly scientific philosophy, as well as a reduction to rational theory of em-
pirical psychology. (LU, I p. 4; Hua XVIII 9) 
 
One of the central new themes that emerges in Ideas, as we shall see, is 
the idea that phenomenology is a transcendental eidetic science and bears no 
relation to empirical psychology, a claim that alienated many of his ‘realist’ fol-
lowers such as the members of the Munich School. His Neo-Kantian critics, on 
the other hand, while approving of his new direction, did not think he had gone 
far enough in embracing Kant.  
One key aim of Ideas is to fix phenomenological language for scientific pur-
poses. Husserl readily acknowledges the problems generated by ordinary lan-
guage. Its meanings confuse and cover up the distinctions that the phenome-
nological scientist needs: 
 
Yet transferences among them have encumbered all these words with so many equivo-
cations – and not least with the sort that stem from gliding over into these correlative 
layers, which science is supposed to keep rigorously and systemically separate – that 
the greatest precaution is in order in relation to them. (Ideas § 95, p. 191; III/1 222) 
 
Loose ambiguous everyday words distort genuine phenomenological find-
ings. Husserl therefore introduces new terms, including epoché, reduction, 
noesis and the noema (the term ‘noetic’ has been in use earlier and the ‘natural 
attitude’ had been alluded to in his 1910/1911 Logos essay ‘Philosophy as Rig-
orous Science’), and later terms such as ‘neutrality modification’ as ways of 
specifying his intended meaning. The noetic-noematic ‘correlation’ is also pre-
16 DERMOT MORAN 
 
 16 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 5, 2015. 
 
sented in Ideas for the first time as a new and clearer way of thinking about the 
intentional composition of Erlebnisse. Husserl is convinced his new terms (in-
cluding the replacement of the ‘a priori’ with the ‘eidetic’) makes his phenome-
nology more rigorous. He writes: 
 
Our new terms [unsere neuen Termini] and the accompanying analyses of examples 
certainly serve us better for the generalities we are considering. (Ideas § 95, p. 192; 
III/1 222) 
 
This does not seem to be completely distinct from the notion of an ideal 
language as developed in the Vienna Circle by Carnap and others. In fact, Hus-
serl remains resolutely optimistic that phenomenological insights can be com-
municated in a suitably clarified language. 
As Husserl announces in his Introduction, Ideas Volume One aimed to de-
velop a method of ‘phenomenological reductions’ that make transcendentally 
purified consciousness and its eidetic essential visible and accessible to us’ 
(Ideas, p. 5; Hua III/1 7). A change of attitude is required from the natural to 
the transcendental, and nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the new 
analysis of intentionality in terms of noesis and noema.  
Husserl’s chapter on the ‘Noesis and Noema’, therefore, exemplifies the 
phenomenological method in action. Numberous eidetic laws and conceptual 
distinctions are identified in the course of his analysis. The chapter’s focus is on 
the familiar phenomenological theme, namely, intentionality, understood as 
‘consciousness of something’ (Bewusstsein von Etwas). Already in Ideas § 84 
Husserl had indicated that intentionality is the ‘the principal theme 
[Hauptthema] of phenomenology’, that which characterizes consciousness ‘in 
the precise sense’ (im prägnanten Sinne, Ideas § 84, p. 161; III/1 187). Hus-
serl, moreover, has moved beyond the descriptive psychology of his earlier 
writings. He is not interested in information about the ‘psychic act’ understood 
in a psychological sense or in the intentional object described in a transcendent 
sense as an entity in the actual world. He is interested rather, as he says, in 
‘“objectivity meant as such,” the objectivity in quotation marks’ (die "vermeinte 
Objektivität als solche", die Objektivität in Anführungszeichen, Ideas § 93 p. 
185; III/1 215). Perhaps even more than in the case of perception, as he dis-
cusses later in the chapter, the case of judgment requires us to sharply distin-
guish between the psychological process of judging and judging considered in 
its essence: 
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Those of a psychologistic bent will take exception here throughout; they are already 
disinclined to distinguish between judging as an empirical experience and judgment as 
an “idea,” as an essence. (Urteilen als empirischem Erlebnis und Urteil als "Idee", als 
Wesen, Ideas § 94, p. 187; Hua III/1 217) 
 
Husserl even makes a personal biographical remark right at the outset in 
Ideas § 87: 
 
In fact (if I may be allowed a judgment based on my own experience), it is a long and 
thorny path [ein langer und dorniger Weg] that leads from purely logical insights, from 
insights into the theory of meaning [bedeutungstheoretischen], from ontological and 
noetic insights [noetischen Einsichten], likewise from the usual normative and psycho-
logical epistemology to the apprehension of immanently-psychological and then phe-
nomenological givennesses [immanent-psychologischen und dann 
phänomenologischen Gegebenheiten] in the genuine sense, and leads finally to all the 
essential connections [Wesenszusammenhängen] that render transcendental relations 
intelligible to us a priori. (Ideas § 87, pp. 172-73; Hua III/1 201) 
 
Husserl is aiming to capture the a priori eidetic laws that govern the tem-
poral flow of conscious experiences and account for their ability to intertwine 
and interweave with one another in the seamless flow. Each Erlebnis waxes and 
wanes and is in itself ‘a flow of becoming’ (Jedes Erlebnis ist in sich selbst ein 
Fluss des Werdens, Hua III/1 167) that itself is part of the larger stream of 
consciousness. Conscious life is, Husserl frequently says, a Heraclitean flux. He 
is at the same time interested in the constitution of enduring or ideal objectivity 
and of the manner in which objects, their properties and contexts (their ‘hori-
zons’), manifest themselves in the flow and maintain their stability across 
changing mental states and attitudes such that we can fix their senses and re-
turn again to contemplate them as the same. Husserl is clear that the various 
transformations that go on in consciousness are never contingent, but instead 
are essentially rule-governed (§ 93). We are in an interwoven matrix or nexus 
(Zusammenhang) this is tightly governed by a priori laws. Earlier, in § 75, Hus-
serl had even spoken of Ideas as generating a ‘mathesis of Erlebnisse’ (Ideas § 
75, p. 135; Hua III/1 158). 
In this chapter on noesis and noema, as indeed throughout Ideas, Husserl 
identifies and articulates a number of these eidetic laws concerning lived expe-
riences. Already in § 41 he had articulated the eidetic law that every conscious 
experience of a material spatial object unrolls in adumbrations or profiles 
(Abschattungen). At the same time, he proclaimed in § 42 that no Erlebnis as 
such, in itself, unfolds in profiles in our experiences of it. On the contrary, its 
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esse is percipi. Each chapter offers new eidetic discoveries, e.g. ‘every inten-
tional experience is, thanks to its noetic moments, also noetic’ (Ideas § 88, p. 
174; Hua III/1 202). It belongs to its essence ‘to have a sense’. Husserl thus 
articulates an eidetic law: 
 
There is no inherent noetic aspect without an inherent noematic aspect specifically 
pertaining to it – so reads the essential law that is corroborated in every case. (Ideas § 




Like perception, every intentional experience has its “intentional object,” i.e., its objec-
tive sense – that is precisely what makes up the fundamental component [Grundstück] 
of intentionality. (Ideas § 90, p. 177; III/1 206) 
 
Husserl also maintains that each Erlebnis has a single albeit multilayered 
noema. It is unified through its sense and a single experience must have a sin-
gle if multiform sense. There is, so to speak, always a single ‘state of affairs’ 
(Sachverhalt), perhaps a very complex one, intended by a single and perhaps 
very complex noesis. Furthermore, different kinds of acts have different corre-
lated noemata. The noemata differ structurally with the acts. So a perceptual 
noema is essentially and necessarily structurally different from a memory 
noema, and so on. There is an essential typology of noemata to be uncovered 
and this is a central task of phenomenology —how does a perceived object dif-
fer essentially from an imagined or remembered object, for instance. 
Husserl begins the chapter on ‘Noesis and Noema’ by invoking the distinc-
tive peculiarity of intentional experience (Die Eigentümlichkeit des intentionalen 
Erlebnisses, Ideas Hua III/1 200) and says that he wants to work out ‘with 
great care the universal difference between noesis and noema’ and their uni-
versal correlation. Further on, he writes that ‘it is necessary to conduct phe-
nomenological discriminations [Ausscheidungen] and clarifications [Klärungen], 
by means of which, too, the sense of the problems to be solved here can first 
be made intelligible’ (Ideas § 96, p. 193; III/1 223). As he puts it, at the be-
ginning of § 92, he has identified ‘remarkable changes in consciousness 
(Bewusstseinswandlungen) that crisscross (kreuzen) with all other kinds of in-
tentional occurrences, and thus make up a completely universal structure of 
consciousness (eine ganz allgemeine Bewußtseinsstruktur), a structure with its 
own dimension’ (Ideas § 92, p. 182; III/1 211). Husserl is seeking to specify 
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the essential structure of each type of Erlebnis —perception, willing, emoting, 
valuing or judging— what they are, as Husserl says, ‘as Idea’ (als Idee), i.e. 
their pure conditions of possibility in terms of their act structure as well as their 
target object type.  
To gain insight into the essence, Husserl claims in Ideas for the first time in 
print, one must apply the epoché, and here Husserl departs from the realist 
phenomenologists. One must apply the procedures of ‘switching off’ 
(Aussschaltung) and ‘bracketing’ (Einklammerung), i.e. suspension of all belief 
commitments, in a particularly vigilant manner to unmask the flow of con-
sciousness in its essential ideality. This bracketing, Husserl insists, is explicitly 
of ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit), of everything in nature, space, time and causality 
(especially as construed in the natural sciences) and also of everything pre-
sumed to be psychological, indeed, of the ‘transcendent world’ (die 
transzendente Welt, Hua III/1 204). The phenomenological epoché, ‘bracketing’ 
or ‘parenthesis’ is given explicit treatment here also and recurs several times in 
Chapter Three of Part Three. Thus he speaks, in § 94, in relation to ‘judging’ 
(Urteilen) of the process of bracketing or parenthesizing —the very term is put 
in parenthesis to show that it is being introduced in a new way: 
 
Not to be overlooked thereby is the phenomenological reduction that requires us “to 
bracket” [einzuklammern] [the actual process of] making the judgment, insofar we 
just want to obtain the pure noema of the experience of judgment.  (Ideas, p. 187; 
Hua III/1 217 
 
After the exclusion of actuality what is left is still the concrete Erlebnis that 
includes or embodies a noetic act (all acts are or embody noeses) that has its 
own noetic content to which there corresponds what Husserl calls ‘noematic 
content’ (der noematische Inhalt). The noetic part of the act includes what Hus-
serl had called in the Logical Investigations the ‘act-quality’, (Husserl remarks 
on the need to revise Brentano’s conception of act quality and matter at §129), 
i.e. an act of perceiving, willing, hoping, fearing, remembering, comparing, lik-
ing, valuing, and so on. The noetic element also contains what Husserl calls 
(introducing another new term) the ‘hyletic moments’ of the experience —and 
in particular its sensuous character.  
For Husserl, our sensory experiences belong not on the content side of the 
act but on the noetic side. Sensations are not actually objects that are appre-
hended (although they are subjectively apprehended and some are responsible 
20 DERMOT MORAN 
 
 20 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 5, 2015. 
 
for displaying (darstellen) the objective sense properties of the intentional ob-
ject). In Ideas, therefore, Husserl retains this notion of ‘sense data’, now reti-
tled ‘hyletic data’. Hyletic data have a peculiar status. Although they convey 
information concerning objective spatial and temporal features of, for instance, 
a perceived material object in space, are not themselves spatial or temporal.  
Husserl had already been using the term ‘noetic’ in his earlier writings —in 
the Logical Investigations for instance. But now he deliberately introduces a 
new terminology that he hopes can be restricted exclusively to the phenomeno-
logical sphere. For this reason, the noesis-noema correlation cannot be simply 
taken as equivalent to the act-object or psychic-physical distinction inherited 
from Brentano’s analysis of intentionality. We are now approaching Erlebnisse 
under the epoché and from the transcendental point of view. 
In Ideas § 88, Husserl introduces the term ‘noema’ for the first time in his 
published works (it had occurred earlier in his lectures). He begins with a fun-
damental distinction between the ‘genuine components’ (eigentliche 
Komponenten) of the mental process and their ‘intentional correlates’ (ihren 
intentionalen Korrelaten), a distinction he says that he had already broached in 
§ 41. This time he speaks of the ‘real’ (reelle) or ‘integral’ components as pre-
cisely those ‘parts and moments’ that the Erlebnis may be said to have 
(Erlebniskomponenten). In § 75 he speaks of the ‘real component part’ (reelles 
Bestandsstück) of the Erlebnis in contrast to its intentional correlate 
‘intentionales Korrelat’ (Ideas § 75 p. 134; III/1 156), which he will later de-
scribe as ‘irreal’ or as ‘transcendent’ to the act. The intentional living experience 
somehow points beyond itself and invokes its transcendent intentional object 
that, nevertheless, still characterizes it essentially. For example in perception, 
the perceived thing is not a really inherent component (der reelle Bestand, see 
the title of § 41), rather it is ‘transcendent’ (§41). The real thing and the per-
ception of it, while essentially interwoven or related to one another 
(aufeinander Bezogen), are not on the same level as parts of the experience. 
Walking around the table I have different perceptions and if I close my eyes no 
perception at all. But the perceived thing can exist without being perceived or 
even potentially intended. The color of the thing is not a real part of the con-
sciousness of that color (§ 41, p. 72; Hua III/1 85) although we confusingly 
refer to them by the same name. The seen shape of a glass [which is actually 
circular] will be seen as circular even though with more exact scrutiny (as a 
DISSECTING MENTAL EXPERIENCES 21 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 5, 2015. 21 
 
sketch artist would do) it is actually presenting as elliptical. In fact, if drawn by 
the artist, it must be drawn as elliptical in order to be seen as circular. The at-
tention can shift from the shape attributed to the object and the actual ‘shape’ 
of the experience itself. 
It is already an essential law introduced at this point that all experiential 
consciousness of objects is given in adumbrations and each determination has 
its own specific system of continuities and adumbrations. There is also an es-
sential passive synthesis that unites each memory with each perception as ex-
periences of the same thing. Each phase of the perception has its own determi-
nate content of adumbrations, its ‘data of sensation’ (Empfindungsdaten, III/1 
85). Furthermore these data are ‘animated’ (beseelt) by ‘construings’ 
(Auffassungen) carried out by the intending subject. They have a ‘presentation-
al’ or ‘displaying’ (darstellende) character such that we speak of them as ‘ap-
pearances of a certain color’, and so on. This distinction between the ‘really in-
herent’ or ‘integral’ (reelle) and the ‘intentional’ components is a reprise of a 
distinction first made in the Fifth Logical Investigation. In the First Edition 
(1901) of that work Husserl speaks of the ‘real (reell) or phenomenological con-
tent’ and ‘intentional content’, but in the Second Edition he renames this the 
distinction between ‘real’ and intentional content (LU V § 16). Here he writes: 
 
By the real phenomenological content of an act we mean the sum total 
[Gesamtinbegriff] of its concrete or abstract parts, in other words, the sum total or 
experiences that really constitute it. (LU V § 16, II, p. 112; Hua XIX/1 411) 
 
He has come to realize that phenomenology identifies more parts and 
structures in the lived experience than the perceived elements that conscious 
attention can bring to light. His example of a ‘phenomenological’ content is that 
for example in hearing a speech, we hear the sounds and meanings as they can 
be parsed semantically to the hearer —we do not hear sound vibrations or oth-
er elements. These are the ‘reell’ contents only apprehended through reflective 
analysis. In contrast, the intentional dimension is presented as being trans-
cendent to the experience and as including ideal elements and distinctions such 
as the difference between the object intended and the manner in which it is 
intended. Husserl does try to get clearer about what he means by this later in 
Ideas —specifically at § 99. He now speaks of the qualities as attributed to the 
object and their modes of appearing in the experience itself and speaks of the 
qualities of the object as somehow ‘ideally [ideall] inherent’ (§ 99, p. 201; III/1 
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233)—they are “Ideellen” in a very special sense. Husserl here makes up the 
word ‘ideell’ to correspond with ‘reell’. 
The crucial nature of this distinction between real and intentional is brought 
home in Part Four of Ideas (Reason and Actuality) where the inherent nature of 
the components of the noesis are contrasted with the transcendent nature of 
the noema to develop an idea of two distinct but related ‘spheres of being’ 
(Seinsregionen, § 128). Noetic analysis and noematic analyses are now seen to 
run parallel but in a different register. The noematic is a realm of objectivity 
that does not really inhere in the conscious stream although it essentially char-
acterizes it in a certain manner.  
Husserl in the Logical Investigations pursued an ‘ego-less’ analysis of con-
scious experience, more or less in the spirit of Brentano, himself influenced by 
Hume. Although Husserl’s belated discovery of the pure ego (and his reconcilia-
tion with Natorp who had been criticized in the Logical Investigations First Edi-
tion) is a central part of Ideas, there is not a great deal in the chapter on 
‘noesis and noema’ about the ego which somehow lives in and across the flow 
of Erlebnisse, as a kind of unity in the flow of change, but he does make some 
remarks concerning the direction of attention and the sending out of ego-rays 
which do have a bearing on his understanding of the ego. Husserl speaks of 
‘egoic rays’ and it is not entirely clear what he means. Already in § 77 Husserl 
says that the ego lives through its experiences (Jedes Ich erlebt seine 
Erlebnisse, Ideas § 77, p. 139; III/1 162, see also § 92), furthermore, he em-
phasizes that the ego lives its experiences and does not simply regard them or 
have them in view (“im Blicke”, III/1 162). Each Erlebnis can however be 
viewed and be made an object of the ego. Husserl makes an interesting but 
undeveloped remark about the place of the ego in the act of attending in § 92. 
In attending there is a beaming or radiating out from the ego —this is not sepa-
rate from the ego— the ego-ray is the ego itself radiating: 
 
The radiating is not separated from the ego, but instead itself is and remains the ego 
radiating. (Der Strahl trennt sich nicht vom Ich, sondern ist selbst und bleibt Ichstrahl, 
Ideas § 92, p. 184; Hua III/1 214) 
 
How does he attend to this? Is this also an eidetic truth? In Ideas, Husserl 
is still perhaps too much in the grip of Paul Natorp’s conception of the ego as a 
subjective source that cannot be objectified. 
In Ideas Husserl claims that the epoché excludes the ego: 
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However, if I carry out the phenomenological epoché, if the “ego, the human being,” 
along with the entire world as it is naturally supposed, is suspended, then the unadul-
terated experience of the act with its own essence still remains. (Ideas § 80, p. 154; 
Hua III/1 179) 
 
He goes on to remark that the pure ego that remains once the human psy-
chological ego has been bracketed has no content: 
 
These distinctive kinds of interwovenness with all the “ego’s” experiences notwith-
standing, the ego living through them is still nothing that could be taken for itself and 
made its own object of investigation. Apart from its “manners of relating” or “manners 
of behaving,” it is completely devoid of any essential components. It has no explicable 
content whatsoever, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure ego and nothing further. 
(Ideas § 80, p. 154; Hua III/1 179) 
 
This brings Husserl very close to Natorp who considered the ego to be a 
pure consciousness (Bewusstheit) that is simply lost when it is objectified. It is, 
for Natorp, a ‘unifying centre of relations’ (einheitlicher Beziehungspunkt) in our 
experiences and nothing more. Husserl announces his reconciliation with Natorp 
and rejects his earlier view: 
 
On the question of the pure ego, in the Logical Investigations I stood for a skepticism 
that, as my studies progressed, I could not maintain. (Ideas §57, p, 106n. 16; III/1 
124 n. 1) 
 
This mea culpa is echoed in the Second Edition of the Logical Investiga-
tions: 
 
I have since managed to find it [the pure ego], i.e. have learnt not to be led astray 
from a pure grasp of the given through corrupt forms of ego-metaphysic cf. note to 
§6. (LU II, p. 353 n. 8; Hua XIX/1 374 n.*) 
 
Ideas, then, although it acknowledges the pure ego, also more or less 
treats it as a pure pole of experience (Ichpol), a source of radiations out, and 
so on, but not having a content that can be further investigated. This will 
change in Husserl’s mature work. Indeed, by Ideas II, the ego has become 
something that has a history, acquires habits, abilities, dispositions, and so on. 
Thus in Ideas II, Husserl would write: 
 
It pertains in general to the essence of every cogito that a new (cogito of the kind 
called by us  “Ego-reflection" is in principle possible, one that grasps, on the basis of 
the earlier cogito (which itself is thereby phenomenologically altered), the pure subject 
of that earlier cogito. It consequently pertains, as we can also say (since the same ob-
viously applies to this reflective cogito as well) to the essence of the pure Ego that it 
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be able to grasp itself as what it is and in the way it functions, and thus make itself in-
to an object. Therefore it is in no way correct to assert that the pure Ego is a subject 
that can never become an Object … (Ideas II § 23, p. 107; Hua IV 101)3 
 
As Husserl will write in Cartesian Meditations: ‘The ego constitutes itself for 
itself in, so to speak, the unity of a history’ (Cartesian Meditations, p. 75; Hua I 
109).4 
Returning to the analysis of the intentional relation, Husserl does 
acknowledge that there is what he calls in Ideas § 88 a ‘real relation’ (das reale 
Verhältnis, III/1 204) —presumably a causal relation between the seeing and 
the object seen, between the ‘perceiving’ (die Wahrnehmung) and ‘the per-
ceived as such’(das Wahrgenommene als Solche, III/1 203) but in the phenom-
enological attitude there is no interest in this real relation. Interest in it is sus-
pended: ‘the real relation that actually obtains between perception and what is 
perceived is suspended’ (Ideas, p. 175; III/1 204, gestört). We are now sup-
posed to be attending to ‘the phenomenologically reduced experiences of per-
ception and enjoyment, just as they fit in the transcendental stream of experi-
ence’ (§ 88, pp. 175-76). A new concept has been introduced here —the ‘tran-
scendental’ stream of experience (der transzendentale Erlebnisstrom) which 
has to be grasped ‘in pure immanence’ (in “reiner Immanenz”, Hua III/1 204). 
It is within this plane that Husserl’s analyses now operate. The ‘natural attitude’ 
(die natürliche Einstellung) encountered earlier in the book (§ 27) is now in-
voked only in order to be suspended. The natural attitude, Husserl reminds us, 
has a certain view not only of its objects but also of subjective experiences 
themselves. They are considered as parts of nature with at least temporal if not 
spatial location. The Erlebnisse as natural events are essentially temporal 
events, they belong to the stream of experience. So, when Husserl says ‘Let us 
pass over now to the phenomenological attitude’, he is now exclusively inter-
ested in ‘the phenomenologically reduced experience’ and the radical modifica-
tion of sense that has been brought about in thinking both of the act and its 
object, to use the older language of the Logical Investigations. As Husserl says, 
 
 
3 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: 
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, hrsg. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1952. Reprinted, Springer: 1991); trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer Ideas pertaining to a Pure 
Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book. Husserl Collected Works III (Dor-
drecht: Kluwer, 1989). 
4 E. Husserl, Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, hrsg. Stephan Strasser, Husserliana I 
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950; Reprinted Springer, 1991); trans. Dorion Cairns, Cartesian Meditations (The 
Hague: Nijhoff, 1967). 
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he wants to investigate what “lies” (liegt .. ein) in an evident way in the com-
pletely reduced phenomenon (§ 90). The focus is still on the individual concrete 
Erlebnis but stripped of its natural, human, psychological characteristics. It is 
now an ‘eidetic singularity’ (§ 75). With meticulous carefulness the phenomeno-
logical observer must pay attention to ensure that nothing is placed in the ex-
perience other than what is actually contained in it, and “lay it in” [einlegen] 
just exactly as it “lies” [liegt] therein (p. 221).  
The phenomenologically reduced Erlebnis now carries as an extra marker, 
as it were, a kind of disruption of the natural direction (Richtung) of attention. 
The Erlebnis is seen bifocally, as it were. It is noteworthy that Husserl’s re-
marks on ‘attention’ (Aufmerksamkeit) appear in this chapter. In the natural 
attitude, our focus is normally outwards towards the transcendent. Using Hus-
serl’s own example, we attend to the blooming apple tree and are not primarily 
attending to our perceiving with pleasure, although we bask in the pleasurable 
viewing. Husserl explicitly says this. But it seems to be the case that we can, 
already in ordinary natural attitude reflection, shift out attention to the felt 
qualitative character of the perceiving. I can say that I am looking dreamily or 
wistfully or admiringly out the window at the apple tree, apprehending the 
character of my perceiving. So it is not just the object as it were that dwells in 
the natural attitude but also the perceiving and normally we do not separate 
them although our natural attitude can focus back and forward across the expe-
rience – which as we see from § 97 is meant to be conceived of as an extended 
temporal process that includes bodily movement (walking to the window, shift-
ing one’s head and eyes and so on).  
Husserl now notes that this Erlebnis is suffused with a natural credence or 
belief-in-being, Seinsglaube, although that term does not appear anywhere in 
Ideas.5 He does speak of the Glaubenscharackter of every act and its compo-
nent element of ‘taking as actual’ (Für-wirklich-Haltung), that is, a component 
of every intention in the natural attitude. This might be regarded as another 
eidetic law:  




5 See Liangkang Ni, Seinsglaube in der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserl (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999). 
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This ‘Seinsglaube’ moreover does not disappear in the activity of switching 
to the phenomenological attitude. It remains what it is but it now gets ‘modi-
fied’ or ‘placed in brackets’ and ‘put out of work’, and this can happen in many 
different ways (in phantasy, in the neutrality modification, in reading fiction, 
and so on). This basic belief still belongs to the Erlebnis as an integral structural 
feature, but now our conscious noesis does not go down the line of living in ac-
ceptance, as Husserl puts it: ‘This thetic actuality is, indeed, not there for us in 
the way of a judgment’ (Die thetische Wirklichkeit ist ja urteilsmässig für uns 
nicht da, Ideas § 88, p. 176; III/1 204). In other words, we now deliberately 
and as a matter of conscious decision, take a stance within the very Erlebnis 
itself. The phenomenological meditator does not externally sit in judgment on 
the Erlebnis, or decide that the perception is in fact a hallucination or whatever. 
Somehow one shifts focus within the Erlebnis itself and take it as a token of an 
essence. After the reduction, we find in the remembering the remembered as 
such, in expecting the expected as such, in the fictionalizing fantasy the fanta-
sized as such. The key term here is ‘as such’ (als Solches). We are moving to 
the sphere of essence and the a priori rather than the sphere of fact. 
The conscious and deliberate application of the epoché is in fact a new psy-
chic occurrence in the stream, a new Erlebnis that acts to modify the original 
Erlebnis on which it is operating. It is a kind of filtered reflection so there is a 
kind of triple layer going on. Husserl explicitly says that the kind of reflection 
which brings the Erlebnis to light in itself is itself a ‘new modification’ (§78). 
One has a consciousness of the original perception and a consciousness of one’s 
original living in it, but that living in is also consciously suspended. These expe-
riences and their conscious modifications sit on top of one another like the in-
gredients of a triple-decker sandwich. Obviously, the application of the epoché 
is itself a new kind of Erlebnis that superimposes itself and alters or modifies 
the existing Erlebnis. A phenomenological epoché, furthermore, involves an act 
of deliberate willing and that willing may not have been part —and certainly is 
not a part of the original perception. In fact, for Husserl as for Descartes, it is a 
feature of perception that what is given is not deliberately willed (unlike the 
case of fantasy). 
Husserl here seems to be thinking not of an Erlebnis as a kind of temporally 
instant act but rather as one that takes place over a period of time, and in the 
concentrating that may or may not be part of the original act we can become 
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aware of different aspects of our own awareness and start to consciously check 
them. In § 92, Husserl makes clear that the ‘fixing of attention’ 
(Aufmerksamkeit) is inherent in the Erlebnis (§ 92).  A new eidetic law will 
therefore be proposed: 
 
There simply are diverse modes specifically appropriate to attentiveness as such. (Es 
gibt eben verschiedene speziell zur Aufmerksamkeit als solcher gehörige Modi, Ideas 
§92, p. 183; III/1 213) 
 
While I am looking at something, I can bring my attentiveness to bear on 
the manner of my looking and this allows the carrying through of the act of at-
tention in a new way. Something like this is what the phenomenological epoché 
is supposed to provide. It is like the manner in which Zen meditation proposes 
to attend to the experience but not engage with it, simply notice it, note it and 
pass on. For Husserl, and this was never fully accepted by his students, disen-
gaging the Seinsglaube component is essential in order to bring the the tran-
scendental structures in play. This new kind of modified attention —one which 
is alert to its own ‘attentional variations’ (die attentionalen Wandlungen) as well 
as to the ‘parts and components’ of the experience is what yields phenomeno-
logical insights. 
With the application of the epoché to the Erlebnis, one now is in the con-
scious presence of a modified conscious stratum in the noesis which Husserl 
has indicated has to be construed as the whole concrete Erlebnis (according to 
a note added in the 1923 copy D). This modification in the noesis is meant to 
bring both the nature of the noesis and its accompanying noema to light. We 
are not just seeing-in-credence, seeing is believing, as it were, but attending 
with varying degrees of attentional focus to our seeing (not now in natural re-
flection) but in transcendental reflection, which involves a kind of disciplined 
and very specific hyper vigilance. The application of the bracketing (the formal 
procedure of the epoché) is a new act but it effects a change inside the existing 
lived experience that is its target and it alters or modifies one component of 
that act, namely its Seinsglaube character, its ‘credential’ character. Elsewhere, 
Husserl likens this epoché to the kind of suspension of belief that one performs 
in reading a fictional novel, where one puts the question of actuality out of play 
and go along with the pretence. 
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Moreover, this new modified attending is supposed to highlight the ‘correla-
tion’. The term ‘noesis’ is chosen by Husserl precisely so we do not necessarily 
identify various noeses with linguistic terms such as ‘seeing’, ‘believing’, ‘hop-
ing’ and so on. It is precisely for the same reason that the ‘neutrality modifica-
tion’ is introduced as a more general term than any skeptical doubting, putting 
into suspension, disbelieving, negating and so on, in § 109. There are a myriad 
of noeses —distinguishing the various shadings of the ‘act’ part of the experi-
ences— that can sit on top of one another, run parallel with one another, con-
flict with one another or modify each other in various ways. There are as he 
says here in Chapter Three memories that are accessed within memories (§ 
92). We can be remembering through to an earlier memory which itself is 
founded on a perception. Husserl says I can recall how yesterday I remembered 
a childhood memory (§ 101). Indeed, even in his discussion of the famous ex-
ample of seeing the apple tree in the garden, although the discussion is pri-
marily about perception, Husserl is also discussing seeing the apple tree in an 
appreciative way, basking in the vision of the apple tree, as it were. He speaks 
of ‘looking with enjoyment’ (wir blicken mit Wohlgefallen) and of the ‘perception 
and the accompanying enjoyment’ (die Wahrnehmung und das begleitende 
Wohlgefallen, § 88, Hua III/1 203). Even straightforward perceiving has levels 
and degrees of accompanying appreciation. In § 92, he says that he is concen-
trating on the intentional layer of perception ‘for simplicity’ but recognizes that 
noeses have much more complex forms.  
How does one discover the laws according to how these noeses intertwine 
and join in synthetic unities? Husserl’s example here in this chapter —as      
usual— is concerned not to allow a kind of fantasy representation to be admit-
ted to the perceptual process. Perception cannot be confused in essence with 
any other kind of representation —otherwise it is representations all the way 
down— repeats argument from Logical Investigations and even from earlier 
unpublished text, ‘Intentional Objects’ (written between 1894 and 1898).6 If a 
perceiving was composed of both a filled intuition of the presented side of the 
object along with an ‘empty intending’ (Leermeinen) of the co-meant but sen-
 
 
6 See E. Husserl, Aufsätze und Rezensionen (1890–1910), hrsg. B. Rang, Husserliana XXII (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1979), pp. 303-348; translated as ‘Intentional Objects’ in Husserl, Early Writings in the Philoso-
phy of Logic and Mathematics, trans. Dallas Willard, Husserl Collected Works V (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 
1994), pp. 345-387;  
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suously empty or unfilled other sides of the object, and if this latter Leermeinen 
were interpreted as a fantasy, then we would never be able to grasp the es-
sence of perceiving as such. Fantasy can, of course, become involved but this 
involves a new imposition onto the original perception, enabled by that percep-
tion and founded on it. Because fantasy in turn is considered as a modification 
of a perceiving, we cannot then explain perceiving as essentially involving a 
fantasy-component. So the only upshot is that we have to recognize within the 
act of perception, different entangled noeses —one that presents in sensuous 
fullness the front-side adumbration of the object, and another ‘presentiation’ 
(Vergegenwärtigung) or calling to mind, that is explicitly not a fantasy, imagin-
ing or picturing (which would have its own fantasy colors, etc). Husserl speaks 
here explicitly of ‘modes of indeterminate suggestion and non-intuitive co-
presence’ (Modi unbestimmter Andeutung und unanschaulicher 
Mitgegenwärtigung, Ideas § 92, p. 183; III/1 212) that are wrapped up in the 
experience. 
Let us now turn to the object pole of the intentional Erlebnis. There is the 
experience of a shared object across different perceivings, imaginings, etc., of 
the same thing. But the ‘noematic correlates are still essentially different for 
perception, phantasy, pictorial envisaging, remembering, and so forth’ (§ 91, p. 
181; III/1 210). There is a unique and specific sense belonging to them: ‘sense 
of a perception, the sense of a fantasy, the sense of a memory —and that we 
find as necessarily pertaining to them in correlation to the relevant kinds of no-
etic experiences’ (§ 91, p. 181; III/1 210). Husserl speaks here for the first 
time of a ‘correlation’ (§ 90), a term that will become crucial for phenomeno-
logical analysis (as Quentin Meillassoux has noted).7 In fact, the concept of the 
essential correlation between noesis and noema is introduced only tentatively in 
§ 91 —it is something whose complete validity still needs to be ascertained, 
Husserl says. Furthermore, although he begins from the analysis of perception 
and imagination (fantasy), he moves on to the noesis-noema structure in 
judgment and willing, extending his analysis has he puts it to the ‘widest 
spheres of intentionality (§ 91). 
 
 
7 See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay On The Necessity Of Contingency, trans. Ray Bras-
sier (London & NY: Continuum, 2008). 
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In § 85, Husserl remarks on the need for terminology and introduces the 
term ‘noesis’ (German: Noese) and ‘noeses’ in the plural to replace words such 
as ‘moments of consciousness’, ‘awarenesses’ (Bewussheiten) (Ideas, § 85, p. 
167; Hua III/1 194). He writes: 
 
These noeses make up the specific character of “nous” in the widest sense of the 
word; leading us back, in terms of all its currently actualized forms of life, to cogita-
tions, and then to intentional experiences in general. Hence it encompasses everything 
that is (and essentially only what is) an eidetic presupposition of the idea of a norm. At 
the same time, it is not unwelcome that the word “nous” calls to mind one of its pre-
eminent meanings, namely, “sense,” although the “affordance of sense” [Sinngebung] 
that is achieved in the inherent noetic aspects encompasses many sorts of things, and 
only as foundation is it an “affordance of sense” that is connected to the precise con-
cept of sense. (Ideas, p. 167; Hua III/1 194) 
 
This is in many ways peculiar —Husserl is claiming that the Greek nous 
(νοῦς) has a connection with ‘sense’ (Sinn) whereas it is more usually under-
stood as ‘mind’ or ‘intellect’ and ‘noein’ as ‘understanding’. There is an ancient 
tradition —found in Homer— where nous is largely connected with sensing. In 
fact, ‘nous’ or the ‘noetic’ is now put forward as a more accurate way of identi-
fying the processes which Brentano somewhat misleadingly called the ‘psychic’ 
(das Psychische). Husserl concludes by saying that ‘the stream of phenomeno-
logical being [Der Strom der psychologischen Seins] has a material layer and a 
noetic layer [Schicht]’ (Ideas, § 85, p. 168; Hua III/1 196). He also acknowl-
edges that he had earlier failed to distinguish these two strata clearly. 
The noetic is returned to in Ideas Part III Chapter 3 § 88 where Husserl 
says that ‘owing to its noetic moments, every intentive process is precisely no-
etic; it is of its essence to include in itself something such as a “sense”… (Ideas, 
§ 88, p. 174; Hua III/1 202). Something noetic is something oriented towards 
sense (in some meaning of sense —including the sensuous). Husserl is still re-
taining the language of ‘noetic moments’ and he is suggesting they are best 
understood as ‘rays of regard of the ego’. What is somewhat unfortunate is that 
the notion of ‘noetic moments’ is not analyzed in detail at this point.  
These noeses occur in strata at lower and higher levels (as discussed in the 
fourth Chapter). In fact, there is very little further about ‘noesis’ in this Chapter 
Three. Husserl is more interested in the components that can be found in the 
full concrete Erlebnis. Sometimes, however, he is interested in the purely noetic 
components and especially in the ‘ray of regard’ [Blickstrahl] of the ego is sin-
gled out (III/1 211). Husserl is not very happy with this being called ‘attention’. 
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He writes: ‘We tend to compare attention to a light that illuminates things’ (mit 
einem erhellende Lichte, Ideas § 92, p. 183; III/1 213), but his own account 
does not does not depart much from this spotlight metaphor. What he does is 
to make attention into a fundamental sui generis form of intentionality. It is not 
a component within the act but an act of a new kind. Furthermore, it does not 
just focus on the subjective contents of the act of perceiving but can be enact-
ed across all aspects of the original act. There are different modes belonging 
specifically to attention; there are different modifications possible in terms of 
the amount of attention being paid, right to the limit case of inattention where 
the perceived/remembered/attended to object is barely present —present in a 
dead kind of way that does not awaken anything. Husserl is also aware that in 
the varying aspects of perceiving as my eyes linger on the object different as-
pects come into focus and others recede into the background although they do 
not disappear altogether (§ 92). These aspects come into view if we concen-
trate on the noematic side of the correlation. There are modes of ‘actualisation’ 
(Aktualitätmodi) and corresponding modes of ‘inactualisation’ (Modus der 
Inaktualität) in a kind of ‘dead consciousness’. 
Husserl speaks of a ‘phenomenology of attention’ (Phänomenologie der 
Aufmerksamkeit, § 92) and notes that is one of the chief themes of modern 
psychology. He even has an interesting but too short footnote on it (Hua III/1 
205n.1) which claims that psychology has misunderstood it and not seen it as a 
‘fundamental form of intentional modification’. Husserl says that attention did 
receive a preliminary treatment in the Second Logical Investigation, §22 enti-
tled ‘Fundamental deficiencies in the phenomenological analysis of attention’, 
and in the Fifth Investigation, § 19. Indeed the Fifth Investigation § 19 does 
discuss attention in a rather subtle manner. Here he repudiates the claim that 
attention is an act that picks out only the ‘content’ of the subjective act rather 
than being focused or absorbed in the object of the act. Husserl thinks in fact a 
new character of act has been brought about when we focus on contents. He 
gives the example of listening to a spoken expression (returning to the discus-
sion in the First Logical Investigation). He says we say the words and attend to 
the meanings and we can of course attend to the sounds specifically in them-
selves but then the meaning is lost. This is not a component act of the original 
listening but a new intentional act with a new object. ‘Attention is an emphatic 
function that belongs among acts’ he says in LU V § 19. More or less the same 
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view is articulated in Chapter Three here —attention is a sui generis form of 
intentionality. 
Earlier in the Second Logical Investigation Husserl distinguished attention 
from abstraction. He criticized traditional empiricist accounts of abstraction as a 
selective focusing on part of the individual content of an Erlebnis. He criticized 
the ‘Lockean prejudice’ that attention only picks out the mental contents of the 
experience. 
 
Unthinkingly one credits to contents everything which acts, in their straightforward 
reference, place in the object; its attributes, its colours, forms etc., are forthwith called 
‘contents’ [Inhalte] and actually interpreted as contents in the psychological sense, 
e.g. as sensations [Empfindungen]. (LU II § 22, I, p. 273; Hua XIX/1 165) 
 
Husserl goes on: 
 
Led astray by the seemingly obvious, one takes experienced contents to be the normal 
objects to which one pays attention. The concrete phenomenal thing is treated as a 
complex of contents, i.e. of attributes grown together in a single intuitive image. And it 
is then said of these attributes, taken as experienced mental contents, that their non-
independence precludes their separation from the concretely complete image: they can 
only be noticed in the latter. How could such a theory of abstraction intelligibly account 
for the formation of abstract ideas of that class of attributive determinations which are 
indeed perceived, but which by their nature never are adequately perceived, which 
cannot be given in the form of a mental content? (LU II § 22 I, p. 273; Hua XIX/1 
165-66) 
 
This is an important point; attention (and a mistaken understanding of psy-
chological reflection) has assumed that the intentional object is actually a col-
lection of psychic contents each of which can be focused on. This precisely mis-
construes the intentional structure of the Erlebnis and the role of the hyletic 
stuff in portraying on conveying the sensuous properties of the object. 
Another point that has to be taken into consideration is that noetic modifi-
cations also affect the noema. The concrete noemata change correlatively with 
changes in the noeses. As well as a ‘noematic core’ (Kern, § 92) (that guaran-
tees that is the same object that is being experienced under different noeses). 
The ‘ray of regard’ (Blickstrahl) can go through several strata of noetic acts e.g. 
remembering an earlier act of remembering. We can go to an object through a 
perceptual noesis or through a remembering noesis and sometimes we will shift 
suddenly from one to the other. 
The notion of what belongs precisely to the noetic there is somewhat com-
plex in Husserl’s account. It is clear that the hyletic moments belong to the no-
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etic act rather than to the noema (which of course also contains intended 
senuous properties) —and in fact that is consistent with what Brentano says, 
albeit confusingly, in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, when he 
speaks of ‘seeing a colour’ as belonging to the ‘psychic act’ rather than being 
one of the ‘physical phenomena’. In the following Chapter Four Husserl will 
more clearly locate the hyletic moments (the ‘stuff’ moments, the sensed col-
ours) in the noetic side of the experience, whereas the colour attributed to the 
object is located in the noema`; 
 
[…] everything hyletic belongs in the concrete experience as a really obtaining, integral 
part of it, while, what “displays” [Darstellende] and “profiles” [Abschattende] itself in it 
as a manifold belongs, by contrast, to the noema. (Ideas § 97, p. 196; III/1 227) 
 
But even these ‘stuffs’ (to employ Husserl’s wonderfully technical term!) are 
animated with noetic moments even while the ego is not turned to them but to 
the objects. These ‘animating construals’ belong to the really immanent aspect 
of the noesis. On the other hand the profiles (Abschattungen) belong to the 
object side or the noema. They are, as it were, ‘noema moments’.  
It is clear that as Husserl writes Ideas his thought is evolving. In the Fore-
word to the Second Edition of the Logical Investigations (Hua XVIII xiv), written 
around the same time as Ideas, Husserl thinks that the Logical Investigations 
did not sufficiently treat of the concept of noesis and noema. Later he will say 
that there was not sufficient awareness of ‘horizon consciousness’. He writes: 
 
As a further defect of this Investigation [he is referring to the First Investigation], only 
understood and corrected at the end of the volume, we must note that it has no regard 
to the distinction and parallelism between the 'noetic' and the 'noematic': the funda-
mental role of this distinction in all fields of consciousness is first fully laid bare in the 
Ideas, but comes through in many individual arguments in the last Investigation of the 
old work. For this reason, the essential ambiguity of ‘meaning’ [Bedeutung] as an Idea 
is not emphasized. The noetic concept of meaning is one-sidedly stressed, though in 
many important passages the noematic concept is principally dealt with. (LU, vol I, p. 
7; Hua XVIII xiv). 
 
Husserl is here claiming that the notions of noesis and noema actually were 
first treated (though not under those names) in the Sixth Logical Investigation. 
Furthermore, he believes that most of the attention there went on the noetic 
side. It is important to clarify how the notion of noema differs from the notion 
of ‘meaning as an idea’. Husserl echoes this passage in Ideas § 94 where he 
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refers back to the Fifth Logical Investigation § 21 where the difference between 
‘intentional’ and ‘epistemic’ essence is distinguished.  
That everything somehow has a kind of sense, that ‘makes sense’ to the 
mind, is the fundamental intentional starting-point. Everything that is manifest 
in consciousness has some kind of coherent sense. Each phase of the experi-
ence also has a sense and here we have to think of sense in some sort of com-
ponent feature, perhaps like phonemes in the constitution of languages. There 
is, moreover, a number of threads of unity running across the experiences. The 
object is experienced first and foremost as the same object given through dif-
ferent profiles and also apprehended in different noeses. They are all experi-
ences of the apple tree blooming in the garden. At the same time the noeses 
themselves are coordinated in a rigorous manner and ‘crisscross’ each other in 
very specific and determinately ordered ways. There are a number of noetic 
elements that come together and are united around a ‘noetic core’. This is 
equally important as the ‘noematic core’ that guarantees the sameness of the 
object. The hyletic moments belong to this noetic core but are different from 
the noetic moments in that ‘core’. 
Husserl is aware that the object has an identity in and through these mani-
festations in different phases of the lived experience. The hyletic data, further-
more, do not determine or anchor the identity of the object across the experi-
ences. For example, I can talk to John on the phone [aural data] and see John 
on the street (without hearing him) —visual data. The visual and aural data are 
entirely different clusters of data —yet they are both appearings of John. Fur-
thermore, John is not some ideal limit at the end of an infinite series of such 
experiences but present in each of them yet not in a static manner. The hyletic 
data —although they do, for Husserl, anchor the intentional function, as Husserl 
says— at the same time underdetermine the intentional object. There can be no 
perception as a perception without hyletic sensory experiencings. That is what 
makes perception perception. 
Without going further into the complexities of the noema, I hope I have 
made clear in this essay how Husserl develops his newer more complicated 
phenomenological analysis of intentional Erlebnisse in Ideas. He remains more 
or less atomistic in his focus on individual acts, such as perceiving an apple 
tree, and, as we have seen, is reluctant to pursue a close analysis of the man-
ner in which the pure ego resides in each experience. But he greatly compli-
DISSECTING MENTAL EXPERIENCES 35 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 5, 2015. 35 
 
cates the manner in which what he previously called descriptive psychology 
uncovers the various inherent component parts in the experience. Each lived 
experience, each Erlebnis, now becomes, under the operation of the epoché, a 
vast field of levels of content, apprehension, profiles, horizons, attentional 
variations, temporal distentions, and so on. Husserl has put the intentional ex-
perience under the microscope of his transcendental phenomenology and an 
entirely new world has been disclosed. This is the radical originality and contri-
bution of Husserl’s Ideas, it not only seeks to lay out the phenomenological 
method in some kind of formal way but it also offers a rich and powerful of 
phenomenological analysis at work. 
 
